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A long tradition in Western thought has enshrined reasoning as the surest way 
to reach a sound decision, although the opposing point of view, that sees intuition as a 
superior basis of many decisions, has had many advocates throughout history. But 
how do people actually balance intuition and reason when making decisions? I report 
nine studies that indicate that people use features of the choice (Studies 1-3) or 
features of their mental states (Studies 4-8) as cues when deciding whether to follow 
intuition or reason. That is, features of the choice and the chooser’s mental state are 
matched to the characteristics of rational or intuitive processing to determine whether 
to follow intuition or the dictates of a more deliberate, reasoned analysis. Choices that 
are seen as objectively evaluable (Study 1), complex (Studies 2a and 2b), or important 
(Study 3) elicit a preference for choosing rationally, as do mental states of carefulness 
and caution (Studies 4, 5, and 6). Conversely, mental states involving vividly pictured 
choices (Study 7) or persistent intuitions (Study 8) elicit an increased preference for 
choosing intuitively. 
 
   
iii 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
Yoel Inbar was born in California and attending the University of California at 
Berkeley, where he earned a Bachelor of Arts in Psychology. After taking a few years 
to explore other interests, he came to Cornell University to pursue a Ph.D. in social 
and personality psychology. Yoel will be moving on to a post-doctoral position at the 
Harvard Kennedy School of Government.   
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First and foremost, I thank my wife, Rachel. Without her unflagging support 
and constant loving encouragement, I would not be writing this today. Thanks, baby! 
My primary advisor, Tom Gilovich, has far exceeded the norm in offering 
support and advice, both professional and personal. In addition to being a warm, 
wonderful person, he’s one of the smartest, most talented researchers I know. I’m 
lucky to have had him as an advisor, and I’m proud and happy to call him a friend. 
David Pizarro has single-handedly made my graduate experience here at least 
75% more enjoyable. Generous with both his insights and his friendship, he’s been 
one of the best things about my time at Cornell. I’ll miss you, man. 
The enigmatic Melissa Ferguson has been an amazing role model for me. Even 
if I’ll never be as smart or insightful as she is, I can aspire to be. It’s been a true 
pleasure knowing her. 
Michael Goldstein, my committee breadth member, has brought a novel 
perspective and an infectious enthusiasm to all of my interactions with him. I know 
that my work is stronger and my thinking is broader due to his generous contribution 
of time and effort. 
All of the social psychology graduate students—but especially Clayton 
Critcher, Jun Fukukura, Karlene Hanko, Erik Helzer, Jane Risen, and Nora 
Williams—have made my life here much, much more enjoyable. They are one of the 
smartest, most interesting groups of people I know, always up for a conversation about 
the nuances of Construal Level Theory or which was the last good season of 24 (the 
consensus is Season 2). I’m sad to be leaving them, but I’m comforted to know that 
we’ll see each other often as we begin the next phase of our careers. 
   
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Biographical Sketch  iii 
Acknowledgments  iv 
Table of Contents  v 
List of Figures  vi 
List of Tables  vii 
Chapter 1: Introduction  1 
Chapter 2: Task Cues  12 
Chapter 3: State Cues  31 
Chapter 4: General Discussion  46 
   
vi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Scatterplot of data from Study 1 with regression line fitted.  14 
Figure 2. Scatterplot of data from Study 2 with regression line fitted.  18 
Figure 3. Probability of choosing the statistically superior bowl, by 
type of choice and faith in intuition. 
24 
Figure 4. Preference for choosing rationally, by type of choice and 
faith in intuition. 
30   
vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of intuitive and rational thought.  7 
Table 2. Percentage of participants who prefer to choose rationally 
for each scenario, by condition. 
43   
1 
CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
What should you do when intuition tells you one thing and rational analysis 
another?  How should you choose, in other words, when there is a conflict between 
your head and your gut?  Since the dawn of the Enlightenment it has generally been 
agreed, in scholarly circles at least, that the head should be sovereign.  Logic and 
reason have long been thought to be the surest guides to the truth and to effective 
action, and as safeguards against the wayward influence of emotion and unaided 
intuition.  But recently the Enlightenment call has not been sounded as often or as 
loudly, and it can be hard to hear among all of the advice to heed intuition.  People are 
now bombarded with the message that they should trust their intuitions and “go with 
their gut.”  In popular culture, individuals are told “not to overthink,” to “listen with 
your heart,” and, of course, to let “the force” be with them.  Popular translations of the 
scholarly literature on intuition and judgment and decision-making tend to reinforce 
this advice (Gigerenzer, 2007; Gladwell, 2005; Klein, 1998) as does much of the 
scholarly literature itself (Bargh, 1997; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 
2006; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). 
The grounds for such advice are not hard to discern.  The psychological 
literature contains numerous examples of spectacular accuracy and insight attributable 
to intuition (Ambady, Bernieri, & Richeson, 2000; Bargh, 1997; Dijksterhuis et al., 
2006; Dunning & Stern, 1994; Ellis, 1984; Hay, Young, & Ellis, 1986; Wilson & 
Schooler, 1991) as well as a large number of erroneous judgments and disastrous 
decisions that can be blamed on faulty rational analysis (Hall, 1980; Baron, 1988). But 
support can be found for all sorts of claims, even the most highly questionable, and the 
issue is hardly settled. Indeed, the psychological literature also contains countless 
examples of spectacularly faulty intuitive assessments (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994;   
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Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982), and the very 
existence of modern technological society is a compelling argument for the power of 
analytic thinking.  
In reality, not much is known about precisely when one should follow one’s 
gut instincts and when one should obey the dictates of a rational analysis.  One 
bankable principle is that one’s intuitions can only be trusted when they have been 
“tuned” in an informative environment (Hogarth, 2001).  The associative connections 
that are the core of intuition are almost certain to be misleading if they were formed in 
an environment containing largely unrepresentative information; this is what gives 
rise, for example, to a number of unwarranted stereotypes (Levine & Campbell, 1972; 
Ross, Amabile, & Steinmetz, 1977).  Exposure to films and television shows in which 
members of a particular ethnic group engage in a level of criminality that is 
disproportionately high relative to real-life crime statistics is likely to lead to a strong 
gut feeling that members of that group are dangerous. Such gut feelings can be 
overcome through the effortful exercise of conscious will (Devine, 1989; Fiske, 1989; 
Kawakami, Dovidio, & van Kamp, 2005), but note that it is the mind’s rational 
faculties that compel one to reject the stereotype. More generally, it is one’s rational 
faculties that discern whether the pertinent data are tainted and whether an intuitive 
conclusion based on these data should therefore be rejected. 
Another principle that may have merit is that the parallel processing of the 
intuitive system can give it an edge when the judgment or decision calls for the 
integration of a great many input cues (Dijksterhuis, 2004).  In other words, to the 
extent that the judgment or decision resembles the task of face recognition, which 
requires the simultaneous, rapid processing of an unfathomably large number of cues, 
one may be well served by honoring one’s intuitions.  One may be well served by   
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doing so, that is, when there isn’t (or one isn’t aware of) an appropriate algorithm for 
solving the judgment or decision problem analytically. 
More generally, Hammond (1996) has observed that just as thinking can be 
ordered on a cognitive continuum from rational to intuitive, tasks can likewise be 
ordered on a continuum from those amenable to rational thought to those amenable to 
intuition. On Hammond’s (1996) task continuum, features of “intuitive” tasks include 
multiple intercorrelated cues; less-than perfect cue reliability; lack of an organizing 
principle or algorithm to integrate cues; and limited time (p. 163). For example, a task 
in which many redundant cues are simultaneously presented visually is considered 
more intuitive, while a task in which a few non-correlated cues are presented 
numerically is considered more rational. Hammond and colleagues (Hammond, 
Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987) showed that when one’s position on the cognitive 
continuum matches the task’s position on the task continuum, task performance is at 
its highest. In other words, thinking intuitively enhances performance on tasks that are 
“intuition-like,” and thinking rationally enhances performance on tasks that are 
“rationality-like.” 
Beyond these guiding principles, there is little to go on when deciding how to 
trade off between intuitive and rational approaches to decision-making.  This presents 
a problem, because most theorists regard intuition and reason as two co-existing 
modes of thought which operate complementarily and in parallel (e.g., Epstein, 1994; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996). Thus, for any given problem decision-
makers might choose to rely on intuition, rational analysis, or a combination of the 
two (Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987). Worse, intuitive and rational 
processes can sometimes produce diametrically opposed responses to the same 
problem (Sloman, 1996). How, then, do people typically resolve this conflict? How do 
they determine whether an intuitive or rational approach is best suited to a specific   
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decision, and how do they reconcile conflicting results produced by intuitive and 
rational thought? What variables affect whether they tend to favor intuition or to obey 
the dictates of their rational faculties?  
Strategy cueing 
Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson (1987) showed that experts made 
more accurate judgments when their cognitive style was matched to the features of the 
task. That is, more intuitive thinking increased accuracy when the task was “intuition-
like,” while more rational thinking increased accuracy when the task was “rationality-
like.” Hammond et al.  recommended that one “maximize the probability of accurate 
judgments by adapting…cognitive activity to the (unalterable) display features of the 
task.” There is no doubt that this recommendation has a great deal of merit for expert 
decision-makers confronted with a decision task in which inputs can be precisely 
identified, and correct responses can be formally defined. However, many of the 
choices that people make are more difficult to subject to this sort of formal analysis. 
Imagine deciding whether to continue dating an exciting but unreliable partner; 
whether to attend a prestigious college far from one’s home or a less well-known 
institution closer to one’s friends and family; whether to buy the sensible brown sedan 
or the sporty red coupe; or even whether to have the pecan fudge brownie or the 
boysenberry pie for dessert—all of these choices might very well evoke a conflict 
between one’s rational analysis and one’s intuitive preferences. When confronted with 
this sort of dilemma, what do people do? 
Task cues. I propose that when deciding whether to favor intuition or reason, 
people may be cued by a resemblance between features of the task and features of 
intuitive or rational processing. That is, people may be inclined to think that they 
should follow their intuitions whenever the characteristics of the judgment or decision 
resemble the characteristics of intuitive processing, and that they should follow the   
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dictates of a rational analysis whenever the characteristics of the judgment or decision 
resemble the characteristics of rational processing. As one example, people tend to 
think of rational analysis as precise and objective and so they might be inclined to 
think they should follow their head when the choice problem they confront is one in 
which the rightness or wrongness of the decision can be precisely and objectively 
defined. Intuitive processes, in contrast, are thought of as relatively inexact and 
subjective, and so people may be inclined to think that they should follow their gut 
instincts when the choice they confront is one that cannot be so precisely or 
objectively evaluated. The main feature of the choice problem (how precisely it can be 
evaluated) is matched to a prominent feature of intuitive versus rational processing 
(the precision of its output).  
State cues. Features of a choice task—or, as I will call them, task cues—are 
one type of information that might be matched to the features of intuition and reason. 
Another type of information that might prove to be just as important is one’s internal 
mental state. Just as people may be cued to process intuitively or rationally by features 
of a choice, they may also look to features of their current mental or emotional 
experience. For example, reason (as I will argue) is seen as more effortful than 
intuition, and so experiencing effort makes people more likely to engage in rational 
analysis (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007). Conceptually, state cues are 
similar to the idea of affect as information (Shwartz & Clore, 1983), and to the notion 
of metacognitive fluency (Oppenheimer, 2006). In all three cases, people look to their 
current mental state to answer the question at hand: When people are asked how 
satisfied they are with life in general, they look to their current mood; when they are 
asked to evaluate an essay’s quality, they look to how difficult it was to read; and 
when they need to decide whether to approach a problem rationally, they look to how 
rational they feel. It is important to note that this is not something that people do   
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explicitly and deliberatively—in fact, drawing people’s attention to these types of cues 
generally eliminates their influence on judgment.  
I have argued that features of a task (task cues) or of one’s mental state (state 
cues) can cue intuitive or rational choosing. But what are the features of intuitive or 
rational thought that might serve as cues? This question is addressed in the next 
section. 
Characteristics of intuitive and rational thought 
Thus far, I have not formally defined the terms intuitive and rational. Most 
people know what intuitive and rational thinking “feel like,” and can readily summon 
to mind examples of both kinds of thinking. However, the idea of strategy cueing 
requires a more detailed account of the specific features of rational and intuitive 
thinking that might be matched to features of a task or of one’s mental state.  
The idea that people employ two qualitatively different modes of thought has a 
long history in social psychology—indeed, James (1890/1950) distinguished between 
associative thought, which he held to be based on associations established by past 
experience, and reasoning, which alone is capable of analyzing new information. 
More recently, a great number of dual-process theories of reasoning have been 
proposed (Chaiken & Trope, 1999), all premised on the idea that thinking proceeds in 
one of two modes: one is relatively slow, controlled, and effortful; and the other is 
relatively quick, automatic, and easy. Among the most influential are the theories of 
Epstein (1994), Sloman (1996), and Kaheman (2003), all of which use different 
terminology to distinguish what I am calling rationality and intuition. Epstein (1994) 
called the first kind of thinking rational and the second experiential; Sloman 
distinguished between a rule-based system and an associative system; and Kahneman 
(2003), following Stanovich and West (2001), used the more generic terms System 2   
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and System 1. Though the theories differ in some details and in what features of 
intuitive or rational processing are emphasized, they also share a large amount of  
overlap. In particular, the four distinctions listed in Table 1 are common across 
theories: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I am not claiming that these distinctions are an exhaustive list of the 
characteristics that distinguish intuitive and rational thinking. Rather, they are a subset 
chosen on the basis of a) widespread agreement between different descriptions of 
intuitive and rational processing, and b) the fact that they might plausibly “match” to 
features of a decision problem or of a person’s mental state, cueing intuitive or rational 
choosing as suggested earlier. The way in which each distinction has been understood 
to be characteristic of intuition or rationality is briefly described below. 
Distinctions 1 & 2: Slow vs. quick & Effortful vs. effortless. This pair of 
distinctions is drawn from the distinction between automatic and controlled 
processing, whereby automatic processing is seen as fast and effortless, controlled 
processing is relatively slower and more effortful (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; 
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). Similarly, intuitions seem to come to mind effortlessly 
and immediately, whereas rational processing is slower and requires some effort. For 
example, consider the following problem, discussed in Kahneman (2003), “A bat and 
Table 1. Characteristics of intuitive and rational thought. 
  Rational  Intuitive 
1.  Slow  Quick 
2.  Effortful  Effortless 
3.  Rule-based  Associative 
4.  Abstract, general  Concrete, vivid, specific   
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a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the ball 
cost?” Many people find that the intuitively appealing (and wrong) answer of “10 
cents” comes to mind almost instantly and effortlessly. It is only with more time, 
effort, and the application of rules of arithmetic that the correct answer (5 cents) can 
be produced.    
Distinction 3: Rule-based vs. associative. Psychologists since William James 
have distinguished between thinking that is associative and based on past experience, 
and thinking that involves the application of rules and formal logic. More recent 
theories distinguishing between intuitive and rational thought view associative 
thinking as the primary mode of operation of intuitive thought, whereas rational 
thought is viewed as consisting of the application of explicitly available rules and 
principles. One of the most well-known examples of this distinction is the “Linda 
problem” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). In this problem, participants read the 
following description of Linda: 
“Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and 
social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.“ (p. 297) 
They were then asked to rank-order the likelihood that eight statements about 
Linda were true, including the statements “Linda is a bank teller” and “Linda is a bank 
teller and active in the feminist movement.” Many people find that the second 
statement (that Linda is both a bank teller and a feminist) intuitively feels more 
plausible than the first (that Linda is just a bank teller), because the description of 
Linda seems most typical of a feminist bank teller (Gould, 1988). Thus, an associative 
process of feature matching leads to an intuitive preference for the description that 
includes the term “feminist.” In contrast, a rational, deliberative application of the   
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rules of probability leads to a preference for the first statement, as the probability of 
both A and B being true cannot be greater than the probability of A being true. 
This view of rational thought as rule-based implies that rational thinking would 
excel at the application of normative (i.e., culturally prescribed) rules or standards. 
Although it is possible in principle to rationally apply an internally consistent but 
completely idiosyncratic set of rules, in practice the rules of rational thinking are 
generally culturally transmitted. In describing experiments investigating departures 
from rationality, Sloman (1996) stated that “rule-based reasoning…reflects cultural 
knowledge (probability theory, class-inclusion logic, etc.) imparted by the 
experimenter to the participant.” For example, research in the heuristics and biases 
tradition (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002), has defined rationality as the 
accurate application of statistical or logical rules, such as Bayes’ Theorem. 
In contrast, the associative nature of intuitive thought is commonly seen as 
giving rise to affectively based preferences derived from personal experience (Sloman, 
1996). Intuitive affective evaluations can underlie a wide variety of seemingly 
disparate reactions to a stimulus (Slovic et al., 2002). For example, consider both the 
risks and benefits of nuclear power. A rational analysis might well show both high 
benefits (e.g. greater energy independence, reduced carbon emissions) and high risks 
(e.g. environmental hazards from nuclear waste, the risk of a catastrophic reactor 
meltdown). However, intuition, based on one’s initial affective response to the idea of 
“nuclear power,” would instead suggest a view of nuclear power as all good (low risk, 
high benefit) or all bad (high risk, low benefit). And, indeed people view riskier 
activities and items as less beneficial, and vice versa (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; 
Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000), suggesting that judgments of risks and 
benefits are both derived at least partially from an underlying intuitive judgment of an 
object as good or bad.   
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Distinction 4: Abstract and general vs. concrete, vivid, and specific. Another 
implication of the view of rational thought as based on the application of rules or 
algorithms, and of intuitive thought as based on affect and personal experience, is that 
rational thought involves a greater emphasis on abstraction and general principles, 
while intuition emphasizes concrete, vivid, and specific images or experiences. This is 
not to say that intuitive thought is not capable of representing abstract categories (cf. 
Sloman, 1996, p. 16), but rather that concrete, vivid stimuli are much more central in 
intuitive than in rational thought. One example of this is the ratio-bias paradigm, 
developed by Epstein and colleagues (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Kirkpatrick & 
Epstein, 1992). In this paradigm, participants choose to draw a random jelly bean from 
one of two bowls in the hopes of receiving money if a winner is drawn. The smaller 
bowl contains one winner and 9 losers, while the larger contains 10 winners and 90 
losers. In this paradigm, many people experience a compelling intuition that the larger 
bowl is better, despite knowing that statistically they are equally likely to draw a 
winner from either bowl. Epstein and colleagues argue that intuition responds to the 
concrete, vivid reality that there are more winners in the larger bowl, while rational 
analysis uses the general principles of probability to determine that the two bowls are 
actually equivalent. The influence of intuition in this situation can be hard to ignore—
many participants were willing to pay money in order to draw from the larger bowl 
(Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992), and a majority preferred to draw from the larger bowl 
even when it contained 9 winners and 91 losers, and was thus statistically inferior to 
the smaller bowl (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). 
Outline of the current research 
In this dissertation, I report nine studies testing the idea that features of 
choices, or of the chooser’s mental state, are matched to features of intuition or reason, 
cueing intuitive or rational decision-making. I examine the effect of strategy cues both   
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on people’s stated preference for an intuitive or rational decision strategy when 
considering hypothetical choices, as well as people’s use of intuition or reason when 
making an actual choice. This approach bolsters ecological validity in two ways: First, 
by asking people about a wide variety of different choices, I minimize the possibility 
that cueing only occurs for a particular, unusual kind of choice. Second, by examining 
people’s actual choices in addition to their stated preferences in hypothetical 
situations, I eliminate the possibility that cueing only influences what people think 
they should do and not how they really act. As will become apparent, the results across 
real and hypothetical choices converge nicely. 
In the next chapter, I report four studies that examine how features of a task 
(task cues) prompt either rational or intuitive decision-making. In Chapter Three, I 
report five studies that examine the effects of features of the chooser’s mental state 
(state cues).  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
TASK CUES 
In this chapter, I examine three task features that I expected to cue intuitive or 
rational choosing: the objective evaluability of the outcome (Study 1), the complexity 
of the choice options (Studies 2a & 2b), and the importance of the choice (Study 3). 
Rational thought is well suited to the application of normative rules and criteria, and 
so I expected that objectively evaluable outcomes, which allow this sort of analysis, 
would cue rationality. Complex and important choices are associated with effort, a 
hallmark of rational thinking, and so I expected that complexity and importance would 
similarly cue rationality. In Studies 2b and 3, I also examine whether chronic 
inclinations to process rationally or intuitively moderate the effects of task cues. 
Study 1: The Objectivity of Evaluation 
Rational thought is well suited to the application of normative rules and to the 
ranking of alternatives according to explicit criteria, whereas intuitive thought often 
reflects idiosyncratic, subjective preferences. This implies that choices with 
objectively evaluable outcomes—that is, choices for which normative standards can be 
applied to determine whether a choice was good or bad—should cue a preference for 
rationality. In contrast, subjectively evaluable choices—that is, choices where the 
standard of evaluation is personal and idiosyncratic—should cue a preference for 
intuition. 
Method 
I created a list of 25 choice dilemmas, which ranged from relatively trivial 
(“Selecting an entrée”) to extremely consequential (“Choosing a college to attend”). 
Twenty respondents, recruited on and around the Cornell University campus, first read 
a brief introduction stating that some decisions are “made mainly on the basis of 
‘intuition,’ or by consulting our ‘gut’” while others are made “mainly on the basis of   
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‘reason,’ or through rational analysis.” They then rated each choice dilemma on “the 
extent to which [it] should be based on intuition versus reason,” using a 9-point scale 
anchored by “Should be based exclusively on ‘intuition’” (1) and “Should be based 
exclusively on ‘reason’” (9). 
A separate group of twenty respondents, recruited in a similar fashion, read a 
different set of instructions stating that “for some decisions, one can objectively 
quantify whether the decision worked out well or poorly, whereas for others whether 
or not it worked out well or poorly is a matter of personal taste.” They were then asked 
to rate each of the 25 choices in terms of the extent to which evaluation of the outcome 
was “an objective or subjective determination.”  These ratings were made on a 9-point 
scale anchored by  “mainly a subjective matter” and “mainly an objective matter.” 
Results  
For each choice dilemma, I computed the median rating of how much the 
decision should be based on intuition versus reason (with higher numbers indicating a 
stronger preference for rational choice), and the median rating of the objectivity with 
which the outcome could be evaluated (with higher numbers indicating more 
objectively evaluable outcomes). I based my analyses on these median ratings, with 
choice dilemma as the unit of analysis.  
Not surprisingly, there was considerable variability across choice dilemmas in 
participants’ preference for deciding on the basis of intuition versus reason.  The 
median ratings ranged from a low of 2 (“Selecting a dessert at the end of a meal at a 
restaurant”) to a high of 9 (choosing “one of two suggested medical treatments,” “a 
stock in which to invest,” and “one of two cities in which to locate a toxic waste 
dump”). The mean of these scores across the 25 choice dilemmas was 6.12, 
significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 5, t(24) = 2.63, p < .02, d = 1.07. Thus, 
there was something of an overall preference for choosing rationally.     
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More noteworthy, however, was the extent to which the variability in 
participants’ responses across the different choice dilemmas was captured by the 
extent to which the different choices were thought to be objectively evaluable.  
Consistent with the strategy cueing hypothesis, the more participants thought that the 
outcome of a decision was objectively evaluable, the more they were inclined to 
believe it should be based on rational analysis, r(25) = .73, p < .001 (see Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Scatterplot of data from Study 1 with regression line fitted. 
I tried to include choice dilemmas that varied orthogonally in importance and 
objective evaluability. However, to the extent that I did not succeed in doing so, it is 
possible that the correlation between objective evaluability and a preference for 
choosing rationally is simply the result of the more important choices being seen as   
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both more objectively evaluable and more apt to be resolved on the basis of rational 
analysis. To test this alternative explanation, I asked an additional group of 20 
respondents to rank the 25 choices from most to least important. I then reverse-scored 
these rankings, so that higher numbers indicated more important choices, and 
computed a median importance ranking for each choice. Although importance was 
significantly correlated with a preference for choosing rationally, r(25) = .41, p < .05, 
controlling for  importance left the association between objectively evaluable 
outcomes and a preference for rational choosing virtually unchanged, r(22) = .71, p < 
.001. 
Discussion 
The results strongly support the strategy cueing hypothesis: the more a choice 
was seen as objectively evaluable, the more a rational approach was seen as the 
appropriate choice strategy.  Thus, the match between a feature of the choice  
(objective evaluability) and a feature of rational thought (the application of normative 
criteria) cued rationality. Similarly, a match between subjective choice outcomes and 
the idiosyncratic, subjective nature of intuitive thought cued intuition. 
Study 2a: The Complexity of the Choice Options 
Rational thought is experienced as relatively effortful, whereas intuitive 
thought is experienced as relatively effortless or automatic. Thus, attributes of a choice 
that suggest effort or difficulty should cue rationality, whereas features that suggest 
ease should cue intuition. For example, presenting text in a font that is difficult to read 
prompts people to process that text more effortfully and rationally (Alter, 
Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007). Another attribute that suggests effort is 
complexity: More complex choices should be seen as more demanding of effort, and 
hence of more rational analysis, while simpler choices should be seen as more 
amenable to intuition.   
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 Dijksterhuis and colleagues have presented evidence that what they refer to as 
“nonconsious” thought results in better decision making than conscious thought when 
the decisions involve choosing between highly complex, multi-attribute alternatives 
(Dijksterhuis et al., 2006).  Thus, the cueing hypothesis leads to the prediction that 
people’s intuitions about when to choose on the basis of intuition or reason (when the 
alternatives are complex, it’s best to choose rationally) is precisely the opposite of 
what the most pertinent evidence on the subject might suggest (i.e., that when the 
alternatives are complex, it’s best to choose intuitively).   
Method 
To test this variant of the cueing hypothesis, I used a list of 40 consumer 
products, developed by Dijksterhuis et al. (2006), as my choice objects. These items 
were designed to vary in both price and complexity. Djiksterhuis et al. calculated a 
complexity score for each product by asking respondents how many aspects of the 
product they would take into account when making a purchase decision.  Objects 
ranged from quite complex (e.g. “computer,” “car”) to moderately complex (e.g. 
“curtains,” “dress”) to relatively simple (e.g. “brush,” “toothpaste”).  
I showed 25 Cornell students who were recruited on campus the same brief 
description of rational and intuitive decisions used in Study 1 and then asked them to 
rate each product for how much they thought “the choice of what to buy should be 
based on intuition versus reason” using the same nine-point scale as before. I then 
used these ratings to compute the median preference for choosing rationally for each 
product.  
Results 
As in Study 1, there was considerable variability across choice items in the 
extent to which participants thought it best to choose on the basis of intuition versus 
reason.  The median preference-for-rationality scores varied from a low of 3 (“book”)   
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to a high of 8 (“car,” “cell phone,” “computer,” and “plane ticket”).  Overall, there 
was a preference for choosing on the basis of reason over intuition, reflected in an 
overall mean across the 40 product items of 5.9, significantly above the scale midpoint 
of 5, t(39) = 4.32, p < .0001, d = 1.38.  
Also consistent with Study 1, there was considerable support for the matching 
hypothesis.  Product complexity (as reported by Djiksterhuis et al., 2006) correlated 
significantly with a preference for choosing on the basis of a rational analysis over 
intuition, r(40) = .46, p < .01 (see Figure 2).  To examine the artifactual explanation 
that more expensive products were seen both as more complex and more demanding 
of rational choice, I asked 21 volunteer participants to indicate what they thought the 
typical price of each product was. I then computed the median perceived price for each 
item. Although perceived complexity was positively correlated with perceived price, 
r(40) = .40, p = .01, the relationship between product complexity and preference for 
choosing rationally remained significant when controlling for perceived price, r(37) = 
.39, p < .05.  
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Figure 2. Scatterplot of data from Study 2a with regression line fitted. 
Discussion 
Again, the results provide strong support for the strategy cueing hypothesis. 
More complex products produced a preference for choosing rationally, whereas 
simpler products were associated with an increased preference for choosing 
intuitively. This relationship held when controlling for the perceived price of the 
choice objects, a possible confound. Once again, features of the task (in this case, 
complexity) were matched to features of rational vs. intuitive thought (in this case, 
effort), cueing an increased preference for rationality when complexity was high. 
Interestingly, this intuition on the part of our participants runs exactly counter to the 
position advocated by Djiksterhuis et al. (2006), who argued that when choices are 
complex, intuition produces better choices than does rational analysis.   
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Study 2b: The Complexity of the Choice Options Revisited 
Study 2a demonstrated that across 40 different choices, more complex choices 
cued a preference for rationality, whereas simpler choices cued a preference for 
intuition. Although this design had the desirable feature of allowing me to examine 
whether cueing occurs across a variety of choices, it also had two shortcomings: first, 
because all the choices were hypothetical, it is possible that cueing produced a stated 
preference for rationality or intuition but would not affect actual choices. Second, 
because I used choice as the unit of analysis, it was not possible to examine whether 
individual differences in preferences for intuition or rationality moderate the cueing 
effect. I sought to address both these shortcomings in the current study. 
For the choice task, I turned to the ratio-bias paradigm developed by Denes-
Raj and Epstein (1994). In this paradigm, which I briefly described in the introduction, 
participants choose to draw a random token from one of two bowls, both of which are 
labeled with the probability of a winning token being drawn. One bowl contains a 
higher percentage of winning tokens, while the other contains a higher absolute 
number of winners. Thus, this task pits the intuition that the bowl with more winners 
is better against the rational analysis that one should choose the bowl with the better 
statistical odds. The intuitive preference for the bowl with more winners can be quite 
strong—Denes-Raj and Epstein reported that 23% of participants chose to draw from a 
bowl with 5 winners and 95 losers over a bowl with one winner and nine losers. In 
other words, nearly a quarter of these participants passed up the bowl that would have 
doubled their chances of winning.  
I adapted the ratio-bias task to create both a simple and complex version. In the 
simple version, participants chose one of two bowls, as in Denes-Raj and Epstein 
(1994). In the complex version, participants chose between two sets of three bowls 
each, with the bowl used for the drawing selected randomly from the chosen set (the   
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composition of each set will be explained below). Thus participants had to consider 
six bowls instead of two when making their choices, and further had to consider that 
any one of the bowls in the set they chose might be used for the drawing. 
The design of this study also allowed me to examine individual differences as a 
potential moderator of the cueing effect. In particular, Epstein and colleagues (Epstein, 
Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Pacini & 
Epstein, 1999) have argued that people differ in the extent to which they prefer to 
process rationally and intuitively. The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein, 
Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999) measures these chronic 
inclinations. It consists of two subscales, one assessing rationality and one assessing 
experientiality (this subscale is also called Faith in Intuition, or FI). Theoretically, 
rationality and experientiality are thought to be orthogonal (Pacini & Epstein, 1999), 
and the two subscales are usually not significantly correlated. This implies a number 
of possible hypotheses regarding the moderation of task cues by rationality and 
experientiality. Those participants who are especially inclined to process rationally 
might choose the statistically superior bowl (or set) regardless of presentation format, 
leading to an interaction between rationality and condition, such that the effects of 
condition would be stronger for those lower in rationality. Similarly, those participants 
who are especially inclined to process intuitively—those who show high faith in 
intuition—might choose the bowl (or set of bowls) with more winners regardless of 
complexity, due to their especially strong intuitive inclination towards those bowls. 
This would lead to an interaction between FI and condition, such that the effects of 
condition would be stronger for those lower in FI. Or both interactions might occur 
simultaneously. Given the number of potential kinds of moderation that might occur, I 
tested main effects and interactions involving both faith in intuition and rationality. 
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Method 
Seventy Cornell undergraduates (45 female) participated in exchange for the 
opportunity to win up to $8 (some also received course extra credit for their 
participation). Participants were told that they would be playing two different gambles 
during the study, which would be explained in turn. After each gamble was explained, 
participants would decide how to play. Finally, after decisions for both gambles had 
been made, both gambles would be played. 
The experimenter first explained that for each drawing, she would randomly 
draw a marble from one of two bowls, each of which contained both red and clear 
marbles. If a red marble was drawn, the participant would win $4, but if a clear marble 
was drawn, the participant would win no money for that drawing. Participants were 
then presented with either the simple or complex lottery.  
In the simple lottery, participants were shown two bowls: One contained nine 
winning marbles and 91 losing marbles, while the other contained one winning marble 
and nine losing marbles. Thus, the larger bowl contained more winning marbles but 
was statistically inferior to the smaller bowl, which had a higher probability of a 
winning marble being drawn (10% vs. 9%). The experimenter explained that the larger 
bowl contained 100 marbles total, that the smaller contained ten, and that the number 
of winning marbles in each bowl was indicated on a label placed in front of it. The 
participant’s task was to choose which bowl should be used for the drawing. 
Participants were asked to choose a bowl before moving on to the next lottery. 
In the complex lottery, participants were shown two sets of three bowls. All 
bowls in the first set contained 10 marbles, but the bowls differed in how many 
winners they contained: the first bowl contained a single winner, the second two 
winners, and the last three. In the second set, all bowls contained 100 marbles, but the 
bowls again differed in how many winners they contained: the first bowl contained   
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nine winners, the second 19, and the last 29.
1 Thus, the second set contained more 
winning marbles but a lower average probability of a winning marble being drawn 
(19% vs. 20%). The experimenter explained that each bowl in the first set contained 
10 marbles, each bowl in the second set contained 100, and that the number of 
winning marbles in each bowl was indicated on a label placed in front of it. The 
participant’s task was to choose one of the two sets, following which the experimenter 
would roll a die to determine which of the three bowls in that set to use for the 
drawing. Participants were then asked to choose their set before continuing. 
Every participant encountered both the simple and complex drawing, in 
counterbalanced order. After participants had made a choice for each drawing, the 
experimenter performed both drawings, rolling a die to determine which bowl of the 
chosen set to draw from for the complex lottery. Participants were paid $4 for each 
winning marble drawn. Participants who were participating for money only (i.e., they 
were not receiving course extra credit) received a $3 consolation prize if they did not 
win either drawing. 
Participants then completed a few short filler questionnaires, followed by the 
24-item short form of the REI (REI-S; Norris & Epstein, 2003). They were then 
thanked, debriefed, and dismissed. 
Results 
Neither gender nor whether participants received extra credit affected 
responses, and so all analyses collapse across these factors. 
                                                 
1 Initially, the large bowls contained 8 winners in the simple case, and 8, 18, and 28 
winners in the complex case. After 28 subjects, this was increased to 9 winners in the 
simple case, and 9, 19, and 29 winners in the complex case. I controlled for the 
number of winners in all analyses, and though there was a main effect of number of 
winners on choices (as would be expected) there were no interactions involving this 
factor.   
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REI. I computed participants’ faith in intuition by combining the 12 items 
comprising the FI subscale (α = .86), and computed rationality scores by combining 
the 12 rationality subscale items (α = .82). 
Between-subjects analysis. For the purposes of between-subjects analysis, I 
split the sample into those who encountered the simple drawing first (N = 36) and 
those who encountered the complex drawing first (N = 34). I then examined choices 
for the first drawing. This analysis is equivalent to a between-subjects design with 
type of drawing varied between participants. To examine the full spectrum of possible 
hypotheses involving individual differences in faith in intuition and rationality, I first 
fit a logistic regression model with choice as the dependent variable and type of 
drawing, faith in intuition, rationality, and all higher-order (i.e. two-way and three-
way) interactions as predictors to the data. No main effects or interactions involving 
rationality emerged (all ps > .20), but there were significant effects of type of drawing, 
likelihood-ratio χ
2 = 4.20, p = .04, and of the interaction of type of drawing and faith 
in intuition, likelihood-ratio χ
2 = 8.46, p = .004.  Therefore, I simplified the model, 
dropping rationality as a predictor (and dropping the interaction terms involving 
rationality as well). The simplified model regressed choices on type of drawing, faith 
in intuition, and their interaction. This analysis revealed a main effect of type of 
drawing: significantly more participants chose the statistically superior but intuitively 
less appealing 10-marble bowl when the drawing was complex (82%) than when it 
was simple (64%), likelihood-ratio χ
2 = 3.87, p < .05. This main effect was qualified 
by a significant interaction with faith in intuition, likelihood-ratio χ
2 = 7.55, p < .01. 
Simple slopes analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed that at one standard deviation 
above the mean  of faith in intuition, the type of drawing did not affect choices, B = 
.799, Wald χ
2 = .79,
  p =.38. At one standard deviation below the mean of faith in 
intuition, the type of drawing significantly affected choices, B = -3.302, Wald χ
2 =   
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7.009,
  p =.008. In other words, participants with low faith in intuition were influenced 
by the type of drawing, while those with high faith in intuition were not (see Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Probability of choosing the statistically superior bowl, by type of choice and 
faith in intuition. Values are predicted at +/- 1 SD of faith in intuition. 
Within-subjects analysis. Most participants (71%) did not switch strategies 
between the first drawing and the second. Participants who chose the 10-marble bowl 
(or set of bowls) for the first drawing tended to choose the 10-marble bowl for the 
second, and the same was true of the 100-marble bowl. Thus, it appears that 
participants’ initial choices served as the default for the subsequent choice. However, I 
examined the choices of those participants who did switch for consistency with my 
hypothesis. When participants chose the intuitively more appealing 100-marble bowl 
for the simple drawing and the statistically superior 10-marble bowl for the complex 
drawing, I coded them as hypothesis-consistent; when their choices followed the   
25 
opposite pattern, I coded them as hypothesis-inconsistent. Of the 20 switchers, 65% 
(13) were hypothesis-consistent, a result that, due to the small number of switchers 
overall, was not statistically significant, χ
2 = 1.80, p = .18. 
Discussion 
In this study, real choices with monetary incentives showed a cueing effect 
parallel to that shown in Study 2a: More complex choices cued rationality, leading 
participants to show a heightened preference for the statistically superior but 
intuitively less appealing option. This supports the contention that strategy cueing is 
effective at guiding actual behavior in addition to influencing the perceived 
appropriateness of rational or intuitive decision strategies for hypothetical choices. 
This study also uncovered an individual difference in responsiveness to cueing: 
The complexity of the choice cued those low in faith in intuition, but not those high in 
faith in intuition, to choose rationally. I did not have a strong a priori prediction 
regarding the interaction between faith in intuition, rationality, and choice complexity. 
However, one explanation for the current results is that high faith in intuition might 
lead one to disregard cues that suggest rational processing. That is, those individuals 
who put a great deal of stock in their intuitions might be quite reluctant to depart from 
them, even when task cues suggest that rational analysis should be favored. I will 
return to this possibility in the next study. 
In varying complexity, I necessarily also changed certain other aspects of the 
choice problem, so it is important to consider whether any of these changes might 
have artifactually produced the observed effects. First, the complex choice set 
contained a higher total number of winners than did the simple set, but if anything, this 
should have produced the opposite of the effects observed here, as the additional 
winners were disproportionately added to the statistically inferior bowls. In the simple 
choice set, the statistically superior bowl had 8 fewer winners than did the inferior   
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bowl, whereas in the complex choice set the statistically inferior set had 51 fewer 
winners than did the superior set. Thus, basing one’s choices only on the number of 
winners would have led to a much stronger preference for intuition in the complex 
condition.  
Secondly, the complex choice involved a chance event (the roll of a die). 
However, it is unlikely that this would have led to the results obtained because there is 
no reason to think that the roll of a die would cue rationality. If anything, the idea of 
chance or luck might be expected to cue intuition. Finally, for the complex choice two 
bowls in the statistically superior set contained more than one winner, whereas for the 
simple choice the statistically superior bowl contained only one winner. One might 
argue that if people were differentiating the bowls based on an extremely crude “one 
winner vs. more than one winner” distinction, adding more winners to the statistically 
superior bowls might have artificially increased their attractiveness. However, a) there 
is no evidence to support the contention that this kind of “one vs. more than one” 
distinction underlies the ratio-bias phenomenon; and b) even if this distinction was 
important, this kind of intuitive heuristic should be especially prominent among those 
with high faith in intuition, when in fact those with higher faith in intuition were less 
affected by the complexity manipulation. 
Study 3: Choice Importance 
Another prediction that follows from the observation that rational processing 
of information is more effortful than intuitive processing is that rational analysis 
should be seen as especially suited to decisions where the stakes are high. If people 
believe that the effort exerted when making a choice should be proportional to its 
importance—that, in other words, important choices deserve great effort—important 
choices, due to their association with effort, should cue rationality in the same way 
complex choices do. Conversely, unimportant choices should be associated with ease   
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and should therefore cue intuitive thinking. Thus, people may be comfortable 
resolving relatively trivial decisions by going with their intuitions but may be more 
inclined, ceteris paribus, to resolve important decisions by adhering to rational 
analysis.  I found some evidence to support this idea in Study 1: ratings of the 
importance of the various choice dilemmas were positively correlated with a 
preference for choosing rationally. In this study, I sought to replicate and extend this 
finding in two ways. First, rather than assessing the effect of choice importance 
indirectly by correlating ratings of importance with preferences for choosing 
rationally, I manipulated the importance of the choice directly.  
Second, I wished to replicate the interaction between cueing and faith in 
intuition that I observed in Study 2b in a different context. Recall that in Study 2b, 
faith in intuition moderated the effect of task cues on choice strategy—those high in 
faith in intuition were not affected by a task cue (complexity) that suggested that 
rational analysis was called for. Similarly, those high in faith in intuition might ignore 
choice importance and continue to rely on intuitive responses, even when the stakes 
are high. Thus, I expected faith in intuition to be associated with a preference for an 
intuitive decision strategy and with a reluctance to change this strategy even when the 
choice was important. 
Method 
Participants were 51 Cornell undergraduates who completed the questionnaire 
as part of their participation in a larger, unrelated study. Two participants failed to 
complete the questionnaire, leaving 49 respondents (32 female).  Of these, 25 were 
randomly assigned to the important choice condition and the rest to the unimportant 
choice condition. Participants first completed the 24-item short form of the rational-
experiential inventory (REI-S; Norris & Epstein, 2003). They then turned the page to 
read a brief description of rational and intuitive decision-making, which stated that   
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some decisions are made “mainly on the basis of ‘reason,’ or rational analysis,” 
whereas others are made “mainly on the basis of ‘intuition,’ or by consulting one’s 
‘gut.’” Half of the participants were then asked to consider decisions that are relatively 
unimportant—decisions described as having “minor consequences” and invoking 
relatively little concern about choosing the right option.  The remaining participants 
were asked to consider decisions that are relatively important—decisions described as 
having “major consequences” and invoking a great deal of concern about choosing the 
right option. All participants were then asked, “For an unimportant [important] choice, 
what do you think is the best way to choose?” Response options were “Based on 
intuition (your gut feeling)” and “Based on reason (your rational analysis).” 
Results 
Participants’ responses yielded clear support for the cueing hypothesis. In the 
unimportant choice condition, 83% of participants thought it best to choose 
intuitively, whereas in the important choice condition, only 24% of participants 
thought it best to choose intuitively. This difference was significant, χ
2 = 17.31, p < 
.001, Cramer’s V = .59.  
REI. I computed rationality scores by combining the 12 rationality subscale 
items (α = .88) of the REI-S, and computed faith in intuition by combining the 12 
items comprising the experientiality subscale (α = .84). I tested the effect of rationality 
scores on choices using a logistic regression in which I regressed participants’ 
responses on rationality scores, experimental condition, and their interaction. This 
analysis showed a main effect of rationality: Unsurprisingly, participants who reported 
higher rationality were more likely to prefer to choose rationally, likelihood-ratio χ
2 = 
11.20, p = .0008. There was no interaction between rationality and experimental 
condition, likelihood-ratio χ
2 = 2.76, p = .10.   
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I next tested the effect of faith in intuition using a logistic regression in which I 
regressed participants’ responses on faith in intuition, experimental condition, and 
their interaction. This analysis showed no main effect of faith in intuition, likelihood-
ratio χ
2 = .64, ns, but revealed an interaction between faith in intuition and 
experimental condition, likelihood-ratio χ
2 = 4.29, p < .05, ΔR
2 = .06. Simple slopes 
analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed that at one standard deviation above the mean  
of faith in intuition, choice importance did not affect choice strategy, B = 1.25, Wald 
χ
2 = 1.69,
  p =.19. At one standard deviation below the mean of faith in intuition, 
important choices cued a preference for rationality, B = 4.91, Wald χ
2 = 8.70,
  p =.003. 
In other words, participants with low faith in intuition showed a preference for 
rationality over intuition when the choice was described as important, while those with 
high faith in intuition were more likely to maintain their preference for choosing 
intuitively even when the choice was described as important (see Figure 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Preference for choosing rationally, by type of choice and faith in intuition. 
Values are predicted at +/- 1 SD of faith in intuition.    
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Discussion 
Again, the results provide strong support for the cueing hypothesis. Replicating 
the results of Study 1, important choices were seen as more demanding of rational 
analysis. Unimportant choices, however, were seen as more appropriate for intuition 
by the overwhelming majority of participants.  
The interaction between faith in intuition and cueing observed in Study 2b was 
replicated in the current study. As in Study 2b, those low in faith in intuition 
responded strongly to cues suggesting greater rational processing, while those high in 
faith in intuition did not. It appears that faith in intuition is associated with a resistance 
to task cues that suggest rational processing. In other words, those who trust their 
intuitions are unlikely to abandon them, even when choices are complex (Study 2b) or 
important (Study 3).   
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CHAPTER THREE:  
STATE CUES 
The previous chapter examined features of a task that might cue intuitive or 
rational thought. In this chapter, I examine a different class of cues: those arising from 
within, from one’s mental or emotional state. Just as features of a task can be matched 
to features of intuitive or rational thought, features of one’s ongoing subjective 
experience can similarly be matched to the features of intuition or reason. And just as 
people look to features of the task for cues suggesting how to proceed, they might 
similarly look to features of their mental states. For example, Alter and colleagues 
have shown that experiencing a feeling of cognitive disfluency or difficulty induces 
people to think more rationally across a variety of situations (Alter, Oppenheimer, 
Epley, & Eyre, 2007). The authors argue that people see feelings of disfluency as a 
cue that more in-depth processing is necessary, and that people respond to this cue by 
processing more rationally.  
Another kind of mental state that might well cue rationality is that of 
carefulness or caution. Those in a careful mindset might find rational thought 
appealing for at least two reasons: First, rational thought is slower than intuitive 
thought, and making a decision slowly and deliberately should be especially attractive 
to those inclined to be careful. Second, rational thought’s reliance on explicit rules 
means that the process leading to a rationally based decision can be precisely 
verbalized, retraced, and verified. In contrast, intuition’s reliance on associations and 
feelings means that the process leading to an intuitive decision is much more 
opaque—intuitions arise in the mind without much insight into what produced them. 
The transparency of the process by which one arrives at a rational conclusion should, 
again, be especially appealing to those in a careful or cautious mindset, who may be 
inclined to re-check the steps by which they arrived at a decision.   
32 
If a mental state of carefulness cues rational processing, while a more lax 
mental state cues intuition, a variety of means of producing a careful mindset should 
lead to an enhanced preference for rational thought: The possibility that one will have 
to justify one’s actions (Study 4), the prospect of a loss (Study 5), or a negative mood 
(Study 6), have all been shown to produce a mental state characterized by carefulness 
or caution, and thus are predicted to cue rationality. 
Another type of mental state cue that may prove to be important is related to 
how vividly or abstractly one pictures a choice. Intuitive thought is often accompanied 
by vivid, concrete images, whereas rational thought is characterized by abstraction and 
generality. It is possible that the fact that intuitive and rational thought tend to be 
accompanied by different types of mental content might lead to a generalized 
association which also functions in the reverse direction: People may be cued to think 
intuitively by picturing a choice vividly and concretely; while picturing a choice 
abstractly may cue rational analysis. I test this hypothesis in Study 7. 
One final kind of state cue that may be important is related to the subjective 
opacity of the processes that give rise to intuitions. Without a clear way to examine the 
basis of an intuitive preference, people may look to their current mental states and 
examine features of the intuitive preference itself to determine its validity. One 
diagnostic feature of an intuition may be its durability: An intuitive preference that is 
equally strong at time 1 and time 2 may be seen as more valid than one that exists only 
at a single point in time. An intuition’s persistence across time, in other words, may be 
seen as a cue to its reliability. In the case of rational analysis, persistence over time 
should have no effect on perceived validity, as the validity of reason depends on 
information that is equally available at time 1 and time 2. Therefore, a conflict 
between intuition and reason that is persistent over time should lead to a greater 
preference for intuition. I examine this possibility in Study 8.   
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Study 4: Accountability 
Accountability—the expectation that one will need to justify how one made a 
decision or arrived at a conclusion—has been shown to lead to a mindset of greater 
carefulness in a wide variety of domains. People who expect to be accountable for 
their actions and judgments are less likely to apply simple heuristics and are more 
likely to engage in an effortful search for information and to scrutinize their own 
thinking (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1992). If a careful mindset is matched to 
the careful nature of rational thought, then accountability should cue a preference for 
rational analysis over intuition. To test this hypothesis, I created two descriptions of a 
choice involving a conflict between intuition and reason. In both, participants were 
asked to imagine that they were deciding which of two cars to rent, and that one car 
seemed rationally superior, while the other seemed intuitively more appealing. In the 
accountability version of this scenario, participants were asked to imagine that they 
were renting the car on behalf of a superior, while in the control version they were 
asked to imagine renting the car for themselves. 
Method 
Participants were 48 Cornell undergraduates (22 female) who completed the 
questionnaire either after being approached on campus or as part of their participation 
in a variety of unrelated studies. Participants were randomly assigned to the 
accountability condition (N = 24) or the no accountability condition (N = 24). 
In both conditions, participants were asked to imagine that they were choosing 
between two rental cars, and that a rational analysis involving “writing down a list of 
explicit plusses and minuses of each possibility, and rationally weighing the 
importance of each good thing and each bad thing” had led them to prefer one car, but 
that they nonetheless had a “gut feeling” that the other car would be better. They were 
then asked to indicate to indicate whether they would choose to “go with your rational   
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calculus (and ignore your gut feeling),” or to “go with your gut feeling (and ignore 
your rational calculus).” 
In the accountability condition, participants were asked to imagine that they 
were renting the car on behalf of the president of the company at which they worked, 
who would ask for an explanation of “what car you ordered and how you made your 
choice.” In the no accountability condition, participants were asked to imagine that 
they were renting the car for a personal vacation. 
Results 
Participants’ responses showed a strong cueing effect: in the no accountability 
condition, a majority of participants (58%) favored their intuitive feeling over their 
rational analysis. In the accountability condition, a much smaller fraction (29%) 
favored their intuitions. This difference was significant, χ
2 = 4.15, p = .04, Cramer’s V 
= .31. 
Discussion 
The prospect of having to justify one’s choice—even hypothetically—led to a 
preference for rationality. Previous research has shown that accountability leads to 
more thorough, careful processing (for reviews, see Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 
1992). In this study, participants were not actually asked to examine any information 
about the two possible cars, so the preference for choosing rationally in the high 
accountability group cannot be the result of greater or more careful information 
processing by these participants. Rather, the current results show that the careful 
mindset produced by accountability cues a preference for rationality, even when 
amount of processing is held constant.  
However, there are other features of accountability that might produce a 
preference for rationality. For example, one might argue that rationality’s basis in 
explicit rules might motivate the use of rational thought when accountability is high,   
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as being able to explain the criteria one used to make a choice is likely to be seen as 
more desirable when one might be called to account. I am not able to rule out the 
possibility that this kind of mechanism contributes to the results of the current study. 
Therefore, Studies 5 and 6 induce a cautious mindset in two different ways, neither of 
which is susceptible to this alternative explanation. 
Study 5: Losses versus Gains 
Negative information generally elicits more careful, deliberate processing than 
positive information: negative feedback (Wofford & Goodwin, 1990), negative 
framing (Dunegan, 1993), and descriptions of losses as opposed to gains (Chatterjee, 
Heath, Milberg, & France, 2000) have all been shown to lead to more careful 
processing. Therefore, if a more careful mental state cues rationality while a more lax 
mental state cues intuition, people may prefer to decide on the basis of reason when 
choosing between losses and prefer to decide on the basis of intuition when choosing 
between gains. To examine this possibility, I created a scenario involving the prospect 
of a loss or a gain in which there was a conflict between rational and intuitive 
preferences. I predicted that participants would be more inclined to decide rationally 
when the scenario involved the prospect of a loss. 
Method 
Fifty-seven Cornell students (30 female) completed the questionnaire as part of 
their participation in a longer, unrelated study.  Of these, 28 were randomly assigned 
to the gain condition and 29 were randomly assigned to the loss condition. 
 Participants read a scenario in which they were asked to imagine that they had 
invested $5000 in a stock that had either appreciated (gain condition) or declined (loss 
condition) in value. They were further asked to imagine that they had to decide 
whether to sell the stock and realize the gain or the loss, and that a rational analysis, 
which involved listing “explicit plusses and minuses of both options” and weighing   
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“the importance of each good thing and each bad thing” conflicted with their “gut 
feeling” about whether it would be better to sell or keep the stock. Importantly, the 
questionnaire did not specify whether the intuitive preference was to sell or keep the 
stock, only that it conflicted with a rational analysis. Participants were then asked 
whether they would go with their rational calculus (and against their gut feeling) or 
with their gut feeling (and against their rational calculus). 
Results 
Preliminary analyses revealed that women were more likely than men to favor 
their intuitive preferences, and so we tested the effect of gain or loss condition in a 
logistic regression which also included gender and the interaction of gender and 
condition as covariates. Gender remained a significant predictor of responses in this 
analysis, likelihood-ratio χ
2 = 6.54, p < .02, but there was no interaction between 
gender and condition, likelihood-ratio χ
2 = 2.46, ns. 
Of primary theoretical interest, there was a notable cueing effect: consistent 
with the prediction that a mental state of carefulness and caution cues a preference for 
rationality, participants in the loss condition were more likely to honor their rational 
analysis over their intuitive preference, whereas participants in the gain condition 
exhibited no such preference.  In the loss condition, 72% of participants said that they 
would choose on the basis of the rational analysis, whereas in the gain condition only 
50% gave the same response, likelihood-ratio χ
2 = 3.91, p < .05, ΔR
2 = .05. 
Discussion 
When considering losses—a mental state known to be associated with careful, 
deliberate processing—participants were more inclined towards rationality than when 
considering gains. As in Study 4, a mindset of carefulness cued a preference for 
rationality. However, both of these studies asked participants for their responses to 
hypothetical situations, leaving open the possibility that state cueing only affects   
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people’s intentions of how to make a choice while exerting no effect on their actual 
choices. The next study addresses this problem by asking participants to make an 
actual choice with real financial stakes. 
Study 6: Negative versus Positive Affective States 
In a wide variety of domains, people experiencing negative moods have been 
found to process information more thoroughly and carefully than those in positive 
moods (for reviews, see Fiedler, 1988; Forgas, 1995; Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz & 
Bless, 1991; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991). For example, those in positive moods 
are more likely—and those in negative moods are less likely—to employ stereotypes 
(Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 1994; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994).  
Those in negative moods are more likely to evaluate arguments based on their quality, 
while those in positive moods are more likely to rely on peripheral cues such as the 
communicator’s prestige (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Bless, Mackie, & 
Schwarz, 1992; Mackie & Worth, 1989; Worth & Mackie, 1987). Similarly, those in 
positive moods are more likely to employ a variety of other heuristic shortcuts (Isen, 
1987; Isen, Means, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982). As Schwarz and Bless (1991, p. 56) 
put it, “positive moods are likely to elicit a processing strategy…that is characterized 
by a lack of logical consistency and little attention to detail,” while “negative moods 
are likely to elicit an analytical mode of information processing that is characterized 
by considerable attention to detail, careful, step-by-step analysis of the available 
information, and a high degree of logical consistency.” 
Many researchers believe that people in negative moods process more 
carefully due to the information about the environment conveyed by negative and 
positive mood states. According to this hypothesis, positive moods signal that all is 
well in the environment and that careful processing is not required. Negative moods, 
in contrast, signal that something is amiss, and that careful processing is called for in   
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order to identify and rectify the problem (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1991; 
Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  
If negative moods do engender a more careful mindset, negative moods should 
cue rationality in the same way that accountability and the prospect of a loss do. In 
order to test this idea, I again turned to the ratio-bias task used in Study 2b (Denes-Raj 
& Epstein, 1994). Participants chose to draw from one of two bowls: an intuitively 
more appealing bowl that contained 9 winning marbles out of 100, and a statistically 
superior bowl that contained 1 winning marble out of 10. Participants were assigned 
either to a positive mood or a negative mood condition, and I predicted that those in 
the negative mood condition would be more likely to choose the statistically superior 
bowl. 
Method 
Forty-four Cornell undergraduates (33 female) participated in exchange for the 
opportunity to win $5 (some also received course extra credit for their participation). 
Of these, half were randomly assigned to the happy condition and half were assigned 
to the sad condition. As participants entered the lab room, they heard classical music 
playing at a comfortable volume. In the happy condition the music consisted of 
approximately three-minute excerpts of Antonio Vivaldi’s La Primavera (Spring), 
from The Four Seasons, and of Hugo Alfven’s Midsommarvaka. In the sad condition, 
the music consisted of excerpts from Tomaso Albinoni’s Adagio in G minor and 
Samuel Barber’s Adagio for Strings. These excerpts have been shown to induce 
happiness and sadness, respectively (Krumhansl, 1997). The music played in the 
background for the duration of the experiment, repeating as necessary.  
Participants were told that the study concerned the effects of music on 
decision-making, and were asked to spend three minutes listening to the music, 
focusing on how it made them feel and on the thoughts and emotions that it evoked.   
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During this time, the experimenter exited the lab room, leaving the participant alone. 
After three minutes had elapsed, the experimenter re-entered the lab room and 
explained the rules of the game: participants were to choose between two bowls, one 
containing a single winning marble and nine losing marbles, the other containing nine 
winning marbles and ninety-one losing marbles. The participants were shown both 
bowls, which were clearly labeled with the number of winners and losers they 
contained. The experimenter explained that she would randomly draw a marble from 
the bowl chosen by the participant, and that if a winning marble were drawn, the 
participant would win $5. If a losing marble were drawn, the participant would win 
nothing. Participants completed a brief questionnaire to ensure that they understood 
the rules, then made their choices. The experimenter randomly drew a marble from the 
chosen bowl, and paid the participant $5 if a winning marble was drawn. At this point, 
participants who did not win the drawing and were not receiving extra credit (i.e., they 
were participating only for money) received a $2 consolation prize.  
Participants next completed a mood scale which asked them to rate how much 
they were feeling each of 18 emotions “right now” on a 9-point scale anchored by “not 
at all/none” and “extremely/a great deal.” The mood scale was followed by one or 
more unrelated filler questionnaires. Participants were then probed for suspicion, 
debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. 
Results 
During the suspicion probe, one participant articulated the hypothesis of the 
study. This participant is excluded from analysis. Neither gender nor whether 
participants received extra credit affected participants’ responses, and so all analyses 
collapse across these factors. 
Manipulation check. The mood scale contained four emotion terms relevant to 
our hypotheses: “happiness,” “joy,” “sadness,” and “unhappiness.” Ratings of   
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happiness and joy were highly correlated (r = .64, p < .001) and were combined into a 
composite measure of happiness. Similarly, ratings of sadness and unhappiness were 
highly correlated (r = .78, p < .0001) and were combined into a composite measure of 
sadness. The two composites were modestly negatively correlated with each other, r = 
-.29, p = .06.  
Participants in the happy condition rated themselves as happier (M = 4.45) than 
did participants in the sad condition (M = 3.45), t(41) = 2.03, p < .05, d = .63. 
Participants in the sad condition rated themselves as sadder (M = 1.98) than did 
participants in the happy condition (M = .80), t(41) = 2.27, p < .03, d = .71. Thus, the 
manipulation successfully induced the desired emotions.
2 
Choices. Fifty-nine percent of happy participants chose to draw from the 
intuitively more appealing, but statistically inferior, 100-marble jar. Among sad 
participants, only 24% chose the 100-marble jar. This difference was statistically 
significant, χ
2 = 5.50, p < .02. Across both conditions, higher composite sadness 
scores predicted a greater likelihood of choosing the statistically superior 10-marble 
jar, likelihood-ratio χ
2 = 6.02, p < .02. There was no effect of composite happiness 
scores on choices, likelihood-ratio χ
2 = .75, ns. 
Discussion 
Sad participants, who were in a more careful, cautious mindset, were more 
likely to follow their rational analysis over their intuitions. This parallels the results of 
the previous two studies, in which accountability (Study 4) or the prospect of a loss 
(Study 5) similarly cued rationality. Across the three studies, inducing a mental state 
of carefulness and caution cued a preference for rationality, while those in a more lax, 
less cautious mental state showed a greater reliance on intuition. Importantly, strategy 
                                                 
2 This analysis includes six participants who won the drawing, which might affect 
mood. However, excluding these participants does not change the pattern of results.   
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cueing occurred both when the choices were hypothetical (Studies 4 and 5) and when 
they were real, with real financial consequences (Study 6). 
Study 7: Abstract versus Vivid Choice Dilemmas 
  Dual process theorists have maintained that abstract thought is largely confined 
to the rational system (Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2007; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; 
Sloman, 1996). Matching the characteristics of one’s internal state with the 
characteristics of rational versus intuitive processing should therefore cue a preference 
for rational analysis when the choice dilemma is imagined in abstract terms. In 
contrast, intuitive thinking is often characterized by vivid and concrete mental images 
(Epstein, 1994), so picturing choices vividly and concretely should cue a preference 
for intuitive responding.  To examine this hypothesis, I selected four choice dilemmas 
from those used in Study 1 and created a longer, more vivid description of each.  For 
each choice dilemma, participants were asked to imagine that they were experiencing 
a conflict between their rational and intuitive preferences.  Half of the participants 
were asked whether they would prefer to choose on the basis of intuition or reason 
after reading the fleshed-out, vivid version of each choice dilemma; the other half 
indicated their responses after reading the terse, abstract version of each dilemma. I 
expected that compared to participants who read the abstract descriptions of the choice 
dilemmas, those who read the vivid descriptions would exhibit more of a preference 
for choosing intuitively. 
Method 
Participants were 73 Cornell undergraduates who completed the questionnaire 
as part of their participation in a longer, unrelated study. Two failed to complete the 
questionnaire, leaving 42 participants who were randomly assigned to the concrete 
condition and 29 who were randomly assigned to the abstract condition.   
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All participants read about four choice dilemmas: “choosing a stock in which 
to invest,” “choosing a city in which to live,” “choosing a private school for your 
kids,” and “choosing a rental car.”  For each dilemma, they were asked to imagine that 
“…your intuition was telling you to choose one option…and reason was telling you to 
choose the other option” and then to indicate whether they would choose to “go with 
your gut feeling (and ignore your rational calculus)” or to “go with your rational 
calculus (and ignore your gut feeling).” The order of these response options was 
counterbalanced between participants.  
In the abstract condition, participants read and responded to the simple, terse 
descriptions of each choice dilemma presented above.  In the vivid condition, in 
contrast, each dilemma was described in richer detail. For example, the dilemma of 
“choosing a stock in which to invest” was described as follows: 
 
Imagine that you are trying to decide which of two stocks to purchase with 
money you received as an inheritance. When you write down a list of explicit 
plusses and minuses of both stocks, and rationally weigh the importance of 
each good thing and each bad thing, this sort of rational calculus leads you to 
believe that Stock A is the best choice.  However, you nonetheless have a gut 
feeling that Stock B would be better.  The conflict between what your “head” 
is telling you and what your “gut” is telling you leaves you in a quandary. 
 
Results. Once again, participants’ responses revealed a pronounced cueing 
effect: for all four choices, a higher percentage of respondents in the abstract 
condition than the vivid condition preferred to choose on the basis of a rational 
analysis (see Table 2). For three out of four choices (city, school, and car), this 
difference was statistically significant, χ
2s > 4.17, ps < .05. On average, participants in 
the abstract condition favored a rational response in 3.5 of the 4 scenarios, whereas  
those in the vivid condition expressed such a preference for only 2.3 of the four    
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scenarios. This difference was significant with a large effect size, t(66.04) = 5.20, p < 
.0001, d = 1.28. 
Discussion 
As predicted, imagining choice dilemmas vividly or abstractly affected 
preferences for intuition or reason: Picturing dilemmas abstractly matched the abstract 
nature of rational thought, and thus cued a preference for choosing rationally. 
Picturing dilemmas vividly and concretely matched the vivid, concrete nature of 
intuitive thought and so produced a greater preference for choosing intuitively. These 
results demonstrate another way that mental states can cue a preference for intuition or 
reason: Mentally representing a choice abstractly cues rationality, whereas 
representing it more vividly and concretely cues intuition. 
Study 8: Persistence of Feeling 
The associative and automatic nature of intuition means that people often have 
little insight into the process underlying an intuitive preference. In contrast, the rule-
based and explicit nature of rational thought makes the process by which one arrived 
at a conclusion transparent. In the absence of direct insight into the process that 
produced an intuitive preference, decision-makers may turn to other features of the 
intuition to assess its validity. One such feature may be persistence: An intuitive 
preference that is equally strong at time 1 and time 2 may be seen as more valid than 
Table 2. Percentage of participants who prefer to choose rationally for each scenario, 
by condition. 
  stock  city  school  rental car 
Vivid descriptions  73.8  35.7  52.4  69.0 
Abstract descriptions  89.7  79.3  93.1  89.7   
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one that exists only at a single point in time. An intuition’s persistence across time, in 
other words, may be seen as a cue to its reliability. In the case of rational analysis, 
persistence over time should have no effect on perceived validity, as the validity of 
reason depends on information that is equally available at time 1 and time 2. 
Therefore, a conflict between intuition and reason that persists over time should lead 
to a preference for intuition, as intuition gains validity over time whereas reason does 
not. In order to examine this possibility, I created a questionnaire describing a conflict 
between intuition and reason that was persistent over time or not. I predicted that when 
the conflict was described as persistent, participants would be more likely to favor 
intuition over reason when indicating how they would choose. 
Method 
Participants were 42 Cornell undergraduates (27 female) who completed the 
questionnaire as part of their participation in a variety of unrelated studies. In both 
conditions, participants were asked to imagine that they were making an important 
decision between two options, and that “reason was telling you to choose one option” 
while “your intuition was telling you to choose the other option.” In the persistence 
condition, the scenario continued: 
“Imagine that you decide to take 24 hours to think about the choice, but at the end of 
the 24 hours you are no closer to choosing one of the options: your rational analysis is 
still to choose option A, and your gut feeling is still to choose option B.” 
In both conditions, participants then indicated whether they would choose by 
going with their “gut feeling” (and ignoring their rational analysis), or by going with 
their rational analysis (and ignoring their gut feeling). 
Results 
There were no effects of gender, and so analyses collapse across men and 
women.   
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As predicted, participants were more likely to prefer to choose based on their 
intuition when the conflict was described as persistent. In the persistence condition, 
62% or participants preferred to choose based on intuition, compared to 29% in the 
control condition. This difference was significant, χ
2 = 4.71, p = .03. 
Discussion 
Participants were more likely to favor their intuitions for a persistent conflict 
between intuition and reason than for a conflict that was not described as persistent. 
This supports the idea that the persistence of an intuition over time is seen as a cue to 
its validity, whereas the persistence of a rational conclusion does not increase its 
perceived validity. Of course, it is also logically possible that participants viewed 
persistent and non-persistent intuitions as equally valid, but viewed persistent rational 
conclusions as less valid than non-persistent conclusions. While this would produce 
the current pattern of results, it is difficult to see why the persistence of a rational 
conclusion would decrease its perceived validity. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Across nine studies, the strategy cueing account was strongly supported: 
Participants showed a marked tendency to match the choice of an intuitive or rational 
decision strategy to aspects of the decision at hand.  Participants overwhelmingly 
approved of a rational approach to choosing stocks or schools, but favored an intuitive 
approach to choosing desserts or dating partners. Participants were cued both by 
features of the choice—its objective evaluability, complexity, and importance—and by 
features of their internal states—carefulness, vivid images of a choice conflict, and 
persistent feelings. Furthermore, evidence of cueing was obtained both when 
participants were asked to rate which way one should choose (Studies 1 and 2a), when 
they were asked how they themselves would choose (Studies 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8), and 
when they made real choices with financial consequences (Studies 2b and 6).  
Psychologists have recently placed great emphasis on the crucial role that 
intuition plays in people’s everyday decisions (Gigerenzer, 2007; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; Klein, 1998) and beliefs (Haidt, 2001), and this emphasis on the 
power of intuition is reflected in popular treatments of psychology as well (Gladwell, 
2005; Myers, 2002). Much of the research on intuition has focused on buttressing the 
claim that intuition often yields decisions that are superior to those arrived at via 
deliberate thought (Djiksterhuis et al. 2006; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). Although it is 
certainly important to understand the circumstances under which intuition leads to 
superior decisions, it is also important to understand when and how people choose to 
decide rationally or intuitively. The current research is one step toward such an 
understanding.   
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Strategy cueing compared to other strategy selection models 
A number of models of decision-making address how people choose a 
cognitive strategy based on features of the task or the environment. Of these, the most 
relevant to the strategy cueing account are Beach and Mitchell’s (1978) contingency 
model of strategy selection, Payne, Bettman and Johnson’s (1993) adaptive decision 
maker framework, and Hammond and colleagues’ Cognitive Continuum Theory 
(Hammond, 1996; Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987). 
Beach and Mitchell’s contingency model. The Beach and Mitchell (1978) 
contingency model of strategy selection posits that decision-makers possess a 
repertoire of decision-making strategies, which can be divided into three classes: 
aided-analytic, unaided-analytic, and nonanalytic. Aided-analytic strategies involve 
effortful computation and the use of some kind of decision tool or aid. Formal 
decision analysis, use of a decision algorithm, or simply listing the pros and cons of 
various options are all considered aided-analytic strategies. Unaided-analytic strategies 
involve an attempt to weigh the pros and cons of various options “in the head” without 
decision aids. For example, attempting to mentally predict the utility of each possible 
outcome, weighted by its probability, is considered an unaided-analytic strategy. 
Attempting to mentally simulate the outcome of making one choice or another is 
similarly considered an unaided-analytic strategy. Finally, nonanalytic strategies 
consist of very simple rules such as “flip a coin,” “choose the same way I chose last 
time,” and “choose what everyone else is choosing.” It is assumed that aided-analytic 
strategies are the most effortful, nonanalytic strategies are the least effortful, and 
unaided-analytic strategies fall in between. Decision-makers are assumed to match the 
effortfulness of the strategy to the perceived demands of the task.  
Beach and Mitchell (1978) discuss a number of task features that decision-
makers are predicted to interpret as demands to process more effortfully. Among these   
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are several that are also important in the strategy cueing account: complexity of the 
choice, importance of the choice, and accountability are all thought to lead to more 
effortful processing according to the contingency model. Thus, there is some overlap 
between the two models in the features of choices that are thought to produce a 
preference for rationality. There are, however, important differences between the two 
accounts. The first concerns how nonrational thought is viewed. According to Beach 
and Mitchell’s model, nonrational thought consists only of very simple rules of thumb, 
and decision-makers only view nonrational thought as appropriate when task demands 
are low.
3 In contrast, the strategy cueing account assumes that people view intuition as 
capable of complex decision-making, and that decision-makers will often prefer 
intuition even for important choices. This leads to the second important difference 
between the two models: The contingency model posits a single dimension along 
which tasks vary to engage more or less rational processing—perceived need for 
effort. In contrast, the strategy cueing account allows for the matching of intuitive or 
rational thought to a wide variety of features of the choice task. Finally, the 
contingency model does not distinguish between cues related to the task and cues 
arising from the decision-maker’s mental state (although it does distinguish between 
characteristics of the task—e.g., complexity—and characteristics of the decision 
environment—e.g., accountability).  
The adaptive decision maker framework. Payne, Bettman, and Johnson’s 
(1993) adaptive decision maker framework is similar to the contingency model of 
strategy selection in that it posits that decision-makers choose from a range of 
                                                 
3 Beach and Mitchell have since proposed Image Theory (Beach, 1990; Mitchell & 
Beach, 1990), which attempts to include a larger role for intuitive thought in decision-
making. However, as Image Theory is quite complex and deals exclusively with the 
perceived acceptability of a single option (as opposed to choices between two or more 
options) it is not discussed further here.   
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strategies that vary in effort and accuracy depending on the demands of the task. 
However, the adaptive decision maker framework focuses on quantifying the amount 
of effort thought to be demanded by various strategies, and on measuring the 
effort/accuracy trade-offs between different strategies using both computer 
simulations and process tracing procedures in actual decisions. More accurate 
strategies are generally thought to be more effortful, and vice versa. For example, the 
weighted additive strategy, in which each feature of each option is weighted by its 
importance and then added to the total score for that option, is by definition the most 
accurate (because it weights and integrates all the available information) but is also the 
most effortful, because it involves many operations for each option. In contrast, the 
lexicographic strategy, in which the most important attribute is determined and the 
choice which is best on that attribute is selected, is less effortful but also less accurate 
than the weighted additive strategy (provided that one performs the weighting and 
adding correctly). 
Like Beach and Mitchell’s (1978) contingency model, the adaptive decision 
maker framework sees strategy selection as determined by aspects of the decision task. 
However, the focus is primarily on factors that might cause the decision-maker’s 
processing capacity to be exceeded, prompting her to fall back on a less demanding 
strategy. For example, time pressure and more complex choice options are thought to 
increase processing demands and thus prompt a reliance on simpler, less effortful 
strategies.
4 
The most important difference between the adaptive decision maker 
framework and the strategy cueing account is that the adaptive decision maker 
framework deals exclusively with at least somewhat deliberative choice strategies 
                                                 
4 Contra Beach and Mitchell’s (1978) contingency model and the strategy cuing 
account, the adaptive decision maker framework predicts less rational processing 
when choices are complex. This apparent contradiction will be addressed below.   
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(although the strategies vary in effort). Even a low-effort strategy, such as the 
lexicographic strategy, or a satisficing strategy (in which the first acceptable 
alternative is chosen) would be considered a form of rational analysis under the 
strategy cueing account. The adaptive decision maker framework does not address the 
quick, holistic, and idiosyncratic assessments that are grouped under the heading of 
intuition by the strategy cueing account. Further, it is not clear how such a choice 
strategy could be included, as there is no clear way to quantify the cognitive effort 
involved in a strategy that does not apply some sort of algorithm. Thus, the adaptive 
decision maker framework is best suited to address under what circumstances 
decision-makers prefer to use different types of deliberative decision strategies, rather 
than how they choose to reconcile intuition and reason. 
Cognitive Continuum Theory. Hammond’s (1996) Cognitive Continuum 
Theory (CCT) is alone among the strategy selection models discussed here in that it 
explicitly acknowledges the role of intuition in decision-making. According to CCT, 
just as thinking can be described as more rational or more intuitive on a cognitive 
continuum, tasks can be described as rationality-inducing or intuition-inducing on a 
task continuum. Tasks are assumed, through an unspecified process, to induce a type 
of cognitive activity that matches their position on the task continuum (although the 
theory also states that a decision-maker can explicitly choose to engage in a mode of 
processing that matches the task demands). Furthermore, when one’s position on the 
cognitive continuum matches the position of the task on the task continuum, accuracy 
is maximized (Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987). Task characteristics 
thought to induce intuition include a large (> 5) number of cues, high redundancy 
among cues, perceptual (as opposed to objective) measurement of cue values, and lack 
of an organizing principle for cue classification.   
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Thus, there is little overlap between CCT and the strategy cueing account in 
terms of what task characteristics are thought to induce intuitive or rational processing. 
This is the result of the different kinds of decisions that are the focus of the two 
theories: As an outgrowth of Judgment Analysis (for an introduction, see Cooksey, 
1996), CCT is well suited to describing judgments in which the inputs are very well 
specified, and accuracy can usually be defined objectively. CCT is less well suited to 
describing decisions “in the wild,” where clearly isolating cues (and defining accurate 
decisions) is much more difficult, if not impossible. For example, multiple redundant 
cues, assessed perceptually, are typical of a great many of the “real-world” choices 
addressed by the strategy cueing account (think of how many intercorrelated cues are 
involved in a choice between cars and apartments, let alone dating partners).  
According to CCT, these decisions should be strongly intuition-inducing, yet people 
prefer to make some of these decisions rationally, and some intuitively. 
The second major difference between the two theories is that the strategy 
cueing model addresses a question that CCT does not: How does a task lead to a 
preference for intuition or reason? CCT does not offer an explanation for how tasks 
induce intuition or reason; it simply assumes that they do. In contrast, the strategy 
cueing model makes explicit how the match between task characteristics and 
characteristics of intuition or reason is hypothesized to lead to the cueing of intuitive 
or rational choice. 
Strategy cueing in the context of dual-process models of cognition 
Among the many dual-process models of cognition in psychology (for an 
overview, see Chaiken & Trope, 1999), several address the circumstances under which 
people prefer to process more or less deliberatively. Two of the most relevant to the 
current research are the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986; Petty & Wegener, 1999) and the heuristic-systematic model of information   
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processing (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Chen & Chaiken, 
1999). These models offer important insights about what influences people’s 
preference for deliberation. However, unlike the strategy cueing model, they largely 
focus on the specific domain of responses to persuasive messages. Also, both the ELM 
and the heuristic-systematic model implicitly assume that more deliberate or 
systematic processing is invariably more accurate than less deliberative processing. In 
contrast, the strategy cueing model does not assume (and, in fact, participants do not 
believe) that intuitive thinking is necessarily an inferior alternative to rational analysis. 
The ELM. The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; 
Petty & Wegener, 1999) has been applied primarily in the context of persuasion—
specifically, to explain how people process persuasive messages. The ELM posits two 
routes to persuasion—a central route, which involves in-depth, effortful processing of 
information; and a peripheral route, which entails less effort and a response based 
largely on superficial cues or heuristics. For example, a central route persuasion 
process might involve careful reading of an argument, analysis of its strong and weak 
points, and an effortful search for further implications of the claims made. A 
peripheral route persuasion process might instead involve a relatively quick response 
to superficial or unimportant cues, such as the number of arguments advanced 
(regardless of quality), or the attractiveness of the persuader.
5 
According to the ELM, the choice to process arguments along the central or 
peripheral route depends both on motivation and ability. Motivational factors that 
                                                 
5 Complicating this account is the fact that a specific cue, such as source 
attractiveness, might operate via either a central or peripheral route depending on the 
motivation of the respondent and its perceived relevance to the message. For example, 
source attractiveness might operate via the central route if attractiveness is seen as 
message-relevant—e.g., an advertisement for beauty products (Petty & Wegener, 
1999). However, this additional complexity can safely be disregarded for present 
purposes.   
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increase central route processing include the personal relevance of the issue (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1984) and the person’s chronic tendency to process systematically 
(Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983). Ability factors that increase central route 
processing include sufficient time to process the arguments (Ratneshwar & Chaiken, 
1991) and freedom from distraction (Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976). Thus, there is 
some overlap between the ELM and the strategy cueing account: Issue relevance can 
be seen as similar to choice importance, and both models predict more systematic 
processing when relevance/importance is high. However, there are also important 
differences between the aims and approaches of the two models. 
The most salient difference between the ELM and the strategy cueing account 
is that the ELM is mainly concerned with responses to persuasive arguments, which 
means that it is silent on the effects of many of the factors that fall under the umbrella 
of strategy cueing. For example, consider the idea that more complex choice objects 
tend to engender a preference for choosing rationally rather than intuitively. The ELM 
would not predict that complex messages would increase central-route processing. 
Rather, it would predict an interaction between a pre-existing inclination to process via 
a central or peripheral route and message complexity—perhaps those processing via 
the central route would be more persuaded by a complex message (assuming that the 
arguments were valid), but those processing via the peripheral route would be more 
persuaded by a readily comprehensible simple message. 
This brings up a less salient but deeper distinction between the approach taken 
here and the ELM. The ELM generally assumes that people believe central-route 
processing to lead to greater “subjective correctness.” Thus, a variable that motivates 
people to value correctness (for example, issue involvement or importance) or that 
allows them the cognitive resources to process in more depth (for example, the 
absence of distraction), should, all other things equal, increase reliance on central-  
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route processing and decrease reliance on peripheral-route processing. This 
assumption effectively begs the question that the current research sets out to answer: 
Under what circumstances do people view rational or intuitive processing as more 
suited to a task? The current results show that rather than believing across-the-board 
that more rational, deliberative, processing leads to better outcomes, under many 
circumstances people prefer to listen to their hearts rather than their heads, even when 
the stakes are high. 
The heuristic-systematic model. Chaiken and colleagues’ heuristic-systematic 
model of information processing (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; 
Chen & Chaiken, 1999) bears a distinct family resemblance to the ELM. Like the 
ELM, the heuristic-systematic model posits two modes of thought—systematic 
processing, which is effortful, deliberate, and analytical; and heuristic processing, 
which is less effortful and relies on cognitive shortcuts or rules-of-thumb. For current 
purposes, the most important difference between the two models is the heuristic-
systemic models’ emphasis on the perceived applicability of heuristics—about which 
more below—and its explicit acknowledgment that an enhanced motivation to be 
accurate might lead to more emphasis on systematic or heuristic thought, depending 
on the characteristics of the problem.  
The heuristic-systematic model’s treatment of heuristic applicability is, in 
some ways, quite similar to the current account of strategy cueing. According to the 
heuristic-systematic model, “a heuristic will only exert a judgmental impact to the 
extent that it is applicable to the current judgmental task or domain” (Chen & Chaiken, 
1999). Applicability might consist of a feature-level overlap, or match, between the 
heuristic and the problem at hand, or of a deliberate judgment that a heuristic is 
appropriate in a given situation (applicability in this sense is conceptually very similar 
to central-route processing of source cues such as attractiveness in the ELM).    
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However, the important difference between applicability as defined by the 
heuristic-systematic model and strategy cueing is the specificity of the matching or 
applicability. According to the heuristic-systematic model, matching occurs between 
features of the specific heuristic and the task. For example, the heuristic “expert 
sources can be trusted” matches a task in which one is asked to evaluate a New York 
Times editorial on the death penalty (example from Chen & Chaiken, 1999). In 
contrast, the strategy cueing account takes a much broader view of how matching 
might occur. On this view, similarities between features of a problem and global 
features of intuition or reason, rather than specific characteristics of a heuristic, cue 
either rational or intuitive decision strategies. 
This distinction is a reflection of a deeper difference between the two 
approaches in how non-deliberative thinking is conceptualized. The heuristic-
systematic model sees the alternative to deliberative thought as relatively simple 
heuristics, or rules of thumb, such as “expert sources can be trusted,” or “longer 
arguments are more convincing.” While intuitive thought can sometimes consist of 
these simple heuristics, it also can be quite complex and capable of integrating many 
different features of a stimulus (Dijsterhuis, 2004; Betsch, Plesner, Schwieren, & 
Gutig, 2001) or of reflecting many years of experience and expert judgment 
(Hammond, 1996). Thus, the strategy cueing account recognizes that people often 
place a great deal of confidence in their intuitions, rather than seeing intuitive thought 
as a less accurate alternative to deliberative processing. The latter view, which is 
implicit both in the ELM and the heuristic-systematic model, is derived from the 
cognitive-miser perspective (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), which holds that intuitive thought 
is a necessary evil that allows decision-makers to cope with limited cognitive 
resources. While the strategy cueing account is in agreement on the point that intuition 
is less resource-intensive than is rational analysis, it also recognizes that people view   
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intuition as far more sophisticated and capable than dual-process models have 
typically assumed. 
When does complexity cue rationality? 
The results of Studies 2a and 2b, in which greater complexity cued rationality, 
seem to conflict with some other strategy selection models, in which complexity (i.e., 
more features per option, or a greater number of options) has been shown to promote 
more heuristic processing (e.g. Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). Other strategy 
selection models, however, have viewed complexity as leading to more rational 
processing (Beach & Mitchell, 1978). One possible explanation for this apparent 
contradiction is that the relationship between complexity and rational processing may 
be curvilinear. A moderate level of complexity may cue rational processing, but a very 
high level of complexity could exceed one’s cognitive capacity, prompting a fallback 
to less effortful types of processing. There was no evidence of this kind of curvilinear 
relationship in Study 2a, but such a pattern might be more likely to emerge when 
decision-makers are asked to integrate complex information online, with limited time 
and without being able to take notes or make use of other decision aids. 
Defining intuition (and rationality): Are dual-systems theories the best way to 
distinguish intuitive and rational thought? 
Dual-systems theories such as those of Epstein (1994), Sloman (1996), and 
Kahneman (2003) provide a convenient framework for distinguishing between two 
broadly different kinds of thinking. However, in dividing a large assortment of 
different mental processes into two general classes, these kinds of theories have the 
undesirable property of lacking of definitional clarity. Rather than describing 
necessary and sufficient conditions for classifying a type of thinking as rational or 
intuitive, these theories aim to provide more of a prototype of intuitive and rational 
thought, which a specific cognitive process can be said to resemble more or less.    
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One appealing but ultimately unsatisfying approach to this problem is to define 
rational thinking relatively restrictively, and to then call everything else intuitive 
thinking. The ELM and HSM take this approach: central route processing in the ELM 
and systematic processing in the HSM are defined as the careful and effortful 
evaluation of the available information according to normatively correct rules. Any 
other kind of processing is deemed peripheral (in the ELM) or heuristic (in the HSM). 
As Hammond (1996) points out, this is not a satisfying solution, because it defines 
intuition only as a negative: the absence of rational thought. It seems reasonable to 
expect that intuition should be defined positively: that there should be a set of features 
that characterize all intuitive processing. Furthermore, this approach ultimately runs 
into a problem of categorization similar to that discussed earlier. Distinguishing 
rational from intuitive thought on the basis of cognitive effort or control, which are 
continuous rather than dichotomous (Uleman, 1999) makes it difficult to determine 
where to draw the line between the two kinds of thinking. How much of the available 
information must be considered for processing to be called systematic? All of it? 90%? 
More than half? What if one evaluates all information, but does so according to a 
normatively incorrect rule? Wherever one draws the line between heuristic and 
systematic processing, the distinction risks seeming arbitrary. 
It should by now be apparent that specifying the necessary and sufficient 
features of intuitive thought is difficult. This may be because there is no one kind of 
intuitive thought: Stanovich (2004) argues that intuition should be viewed as a set of 
evolved special-purpose systems designed for specific tasks, such as emotion 
perception, theory of mind, and intuitive physics. Similarly, Gigerenzer (2007) views 
intuition as consisting of a “heuristic toolbox” of simple but effective problem-solving 
strategies, such as choosing the option that feels most familiar. If one accepts the   
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argument that intuition consists of a set of special-purpose systems, is it possible to 
specify an essential feature that all intuitions share? 
One possible candidate arises from the differing phenomenological experience 
associated with rational and intuitive thinking. When thinking rationally, one is aware 
of following an explicit rule: think of doing long division, balancing your checkbook, 
or deducing a conclusion from a set of premises. In contrast, intuitions seem to present 
themselves to consciousness as finished products, without any experience of following 
a series of steps to reach a conclusion. Think of evaluating whether a sentence in one’s 
native language is grammatical: in most cases, the conclusion (a feeling that the 
sentence is grammatical or not) arrives first. Subsequently, one might, with a good 
knowledge of the rules of grammar, provide support for the conclusion, although this 
need not be the case: native language speakers are often unaware of the underlying 
rules that guide their judgments of whether a sentence is grammatical.  
Thus, the proposed distinction is that when thinking rationally, we have the 
experience of deliberately following an explicit rule or plan. When thinking 
intuitively, we have the experience of arriving at a conclusion without awareness of 
the steps that led to it: We are presented with the end product of a train of thought 
without experiencing the process that preceded it. I suggest that the term process 
unawareness is a good description of this experience, although with the caveat that 
people may sometimes know the process that produced an intuitive judgment even 
though they don’t subjectively experience the process as it occurs.  
This distinction has the desirable features of being simple yet relatively 
precise. It also avoids the implicit value judgment inherent in many distinctions 
between rational and intuitive thinking, in which more deliberative thought is seen as 
more sophisticated and hence more desirable. Under the current distinction, rational 
thinking might consist of consciously applying a very simple rule (for example, that   
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experts should always be trusted, or that one should always choose the most popular 
option), while intuition might consist of a very complex integration of many cues (for 
example, expert judgments of which chess positions are “good” or “bad”). 
Distinguishing rational and intuitive thought on the basis of awareness rather than 
effort also avoids the problem of categorization discussed earlier. Whereas effort is 
continuous, awareness is dichotomous: one either has the experience of following a 
rule and arriving at a conclusion, or one does not. 
Are people’s intuitions about intuition correct?  
So far, I have said little about the extent to which the influence of cueing on 
strategy selection is normatively appropriate or defensible. This is largely because, 
with a few exceptions (e.g. Djiksterhuis et al., 2006; Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & 
Pearson, 1997) little is known about the circumstances under which deliberate 
decisions are superior to intuitive ones or vice versa. Interestingly, however, some of 
the existing data on the subject is in stark conflict with participants’ responses. In 
particular, Djiksterhuis et al. (2006) found that for choices between objects with many 
different attributes, the quality of people’s choices and their satisfaction with what 
they chose declined with the amount of rational thought that went into their choice. 
Djiksterhuis et al. argued that this was due to the superiority of intuition (or, as they 
put it, “unconscious thought”), at integrating the multiple trade-offs inherent in 
complex choices: The parallel nature of intuitive processing is thought to be superior 
to the serial nature of deliberate thought when the input to the decision is complex. Of 
course, this is precisely the opposite of the belief held by participants, who thought 
that more complex choices should be made rationally, not intuitively. 
It is also difficult to view the influence of most mental state cues as 
normatively defensible. The preference for the statistically inferior drawing shown by 
happy participants in Study 6, for example, should probably be regarded as a bias (and   
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participants might well correct this bias were their attention drawn to the effect of their 
mood on their choices). Likewise, it is difficult to see what normative rule would 
justify deciding whether to sell a stock intuitively rather than rationally because the 
stock went up rather than down (Study 5). Finally, the added details in the vivid 
scenarios in Study 7 added no diagnostic information about the choice options, so 
there is no normatively justifiable explanation for the increased preference for 
intuition in the vivid condition.  
However, the effects of accountability (Study 4) and the persistence of 
intuition (Study 8) might be normatively justifiable. There are reasons to prefer a 
rational analysis when one might have to explain one’s thinking, and the persistence of 
an intuition might in fact be a reasonable cue to its validity. 
Taking a broader view of the appropriateness of intuitive thought, a substantial 
literature comparing the relative accuracy of statistical (i.e., formula-based) and 
clinical (i.e., “in the head”) judgment in predictions of phenomena from mental illness 
to parole violations to college performance has shown that actuarial formulas almost 
invariably outperform expert judges (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989). While this 
literature leaves open exactly how judges are making their decisions (for example, 
judges may be engaging in a very deliberative process of weighting and adding 
different cues, but may be weighting cues incorrectly or ignoring important cues 
entirely), these results do call into question how much confidence should be placed in 
“expert intuition,” at least in domains where an actuarial formula can be empirically 
derived and verified. Of course, people often need to make judgments in domains 
where no such formula exists, in which case a reliance on intuition could be quite 
justifiable.   
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Future directions. 
In the present research, I have attempted to vary or measure a single cue per 
study, holding other factors constant. While this approach has made examining the 
strategy cueing hypothesis more tractable methodologically, it does not allow for the 
examination of the possible interactive effects of multiple cues—and most real-world 
choices certainly have more than one cue suggesting intuition or reason. The simplest 
possibility is that the effects of multiple cues are additive. There is some support for 
this possibility in Study 1, in which choice importance and objective evaluability of 
the outcome contributed simultaneously and independently to a preference for 
rationality. However, I have not examined this possibility systematically, and it is 
certainly possible that multiple cues might have interaction effects. Future research 
should investigate whether cues combine additively, interactively, or both. 
Past theoretical accounts of how decision-makers select choice strategies have 
focused on two factors: the decision-maker’s motivation to exert cognitive effort, and 
her ability to do so (e.g. Chaiken, 1980; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). This focus is entirely reasonable: Surely motivation and ability do 
play a role in the selection of a decision strategy. However, the results reported here 
suggest that an exclusive focus on these two factors leaves out much of what affects 
people’s decision strategy choices in the “real world.” The current research is an 
attempt to broaden the picture by examining a large variety of different choices and 
identifying a wider variety of strategy selection cues. This approach has costs—
positing many factors rather than two entails theoretical and methodological 
complications. However, I believe that the potential benefits of a more thorough and 
accurate understanding of how people actually choose decision strategies justifies 
these costs.   
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Although I have identified some important characteristics of different choices 
that cue an intuitive or rational decision strategy, I do not suppose that I have 
exhaustively covered all possible cues. A large number of features have been 
identified as characteristic of rational and intuitive thinking, and many of these 
features might be plausible cues. For example, Kahneman and Frederick (2002) 
describe intuitive thought as “parallel,” and rational (or, in their words, “reflective”) 
thought as “serial.” Might decisions that seem relatively serial—i.e., decisions that 
involve a number of discrete steps—evoke a preference for deciding rationally 
compared to more “holistic” decisions that are made “all at once”? As another 
example, theorists generally see intuitive thought as faster than rational analysis. 
Might inducing a mental state of “quickness”—perhaps by asking subjects to make a 
series of fast judgments or decisions—subsequently lead to a preference for intuition? 
Finally, the precise, rule-based nature of rational thought is to some degree dependent 
on precise, clearly defined input. Representing decision cues precisely should 
therefore favor rational analysis, while representing cues more approximately should 
favor intuition—a point that is also made by Hammond (1996). Exploration of these 
sorts of issues is likely to provide additional insight into people’s intuitions about 
when it is best to decide intuitively or deliberately.   
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